I am an applied microeconomic theorist with a focus on organizational economics and industrial organization.
At a broad level, my research studies how incentives—predominately financial ones—affect the behaviors of individuals and organizations. One line of research studies how firms can design effective incentive schemes to motivate their employees. Another line analyzes public good provision problems, and specifically, how inefficiencies such as freeriding can be attenuated.
At Kellogg, I teach Strategy and Organizations (STRT 452), an elective MBA course on organizational economics, which offers a microeconomic approach to both the internal organization of firms and its relationship with their rivals' overall strategies. Topics include incentive pay, decentralization (e.g., transfer pricing and coordination issues), purpose-driven organizations, strategic communication, horizontal mergers, and vertical integration. I also teach Data-Driven Theory, a PhD course that familiarizes students with research at the interface of theory and empirics. Topics include contract theory under moral hazard and adverse selection, market design, reinforcement learning (algorithmic pricing), taxation, and social insurance.
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